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An important problem in counterinsurgency is the screen-
ing of the populace through search and interrogation, so as
to apprehend insurgents and their supporters. The problem
is one of sequential decision making. Decisions must be
made as to the frequency of operations and the duration of
each and the size of the force to be used. Recursive re-
lationships are developed describing the change in the in-
surgent population contingent upon whether screening opera-
tions occur. The cost criteria includes setup costs, unit
screening costs, costs for insurgents presence in the area,
and the cost of insurgents remaining at the end of the
planning period. A numerical example is solved using a




I . INTRODUCTION 9
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOTAL-COST FUNCTION 14
III. DETERMINING THE MINIMUM TOTAL-COST 28
SCREENING PLAN





I. Calculated Values for Nodes and 34
Arcs for the Numerical Example.
II. Total-Cost for Nodes in Time 38
Period 3.
III. Total-Cost for Unmarked Nodes 38




1. Screening Plan Graph with Four 31
Time Periods
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Pro-
fessor Glenn F. Lindsay, who suggested the problem which
was discussed, and provided much assistance throughout the
preparation of this thesis; and to thank Professor E. B.
Barrett for suggesting the shortest-path algorithm as a
means of finding a solution to the problem. The author
also wishes to express his appreciation to his wife who
assisted in the typing of the many drafts and for keeping
our family functioning without much assistance from me.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A recent article in a military magazine tells of an
operation conducted by Vietnamese popular forces and dis-
trict police with their American advisors and suoporting
C g i
elements. The objective of this operation was to iden-
tify and neutralize the communist underground in a village.
During the two weeks the forces were in the area, they
attempted to identify and apprehend the members of the
communist underground and their supporters. The government
forces reorganized and retrained the village defense force,
civic action programs were undertaken, and assistance was
given in the fields of health, education, and agriculture.
At the end of the two week operation the government forces
had captured seventy-six communists. Two months after the
forces left, the communists were able to again raid the
village council office. Three months after the initial
operation, a similar operation was conducted in the same
village. During this operation, thirty communists were
found. Some were agents that had escaped detection during
the first operation, others were supporters recruited since
that operation.
This narrative illustrates a question that faces many
of the commanders of military units involved in counterin-
surgency operations. That question is, given that insur-
gents are in an area, how often should forces enter the area
to apprehend insurgents and neutralize the affects of their
organization. Another question is how long should the
government forces stay in the area. In the narrative above,
the forces stayed for two weeks the first time, and came
back to the area after a period of two months. If the
government operation had been of a longer duration the
first time, it is possible that the interval between opera-
tions could be increased. It is the problem of controlling
the number of insurgents in an area through the screening
of the populace that we will discuss.
Definition and Phases of an Insurgency
Before discussing a particular problem area within the
insurgent movement, it is appropriate to define an insur-
gency and discuss the characteristic phases of an insurgen-
cy. An insurgency may be defined as
... a subversive, illegal attempt to weaken,
modify or replace an existing governing au-
thority through the protracted use or
threatened use of force by an organized group
of indigenous people outside the established
government structure . [5]
An insurgency is generally classified as having four
phases. In Phase I the social, economic, or political
conditions may be such as to cause the population to be
discontented with the present government. Also, the
government may not be responsive to the people. If such
issues are absent other factors may be exploited by grouos
which are attempting to gain control. Phase II starts
with the forming of the insurgent organization for an armed
insurrection. Underground cells are established as are
communication and supply lines. Control by the insurgents
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in the rural areas is a major objective. Phase III
commences when insurgent control is established in the
villages. With small units of squad and platoon size
formed in Phase II, the larger insurgent units are formed.
These units train in the rural areas which are under the
insurgent's control, and they become more active as the
phase progresses. By the end of Phase III the majority of
the country's land mass is under the control of the insur-
gents. In Phase IV, the insurgent forces are strong enough
to revert to conventional warfare. They have complete con-
trol except for government strongholds which may be under
seige. Within one country it is possible to have various
areas experiencing different phases of the insurgency at
the same time. The model that is presented here is directed
towards countering Phase II insurgencv operations in which
the insurgents are still attempting to gain control of an
area, with most of their activities of a covert nature.
Neutralization of Insurgent Movement
In an insurgency, one of the tasks of the government's
military forces is to eliminate or neutralize the insur-
gents with what is normally a constrained amount of re-
sources. The number of men available for the military
forces and for government civic programs is limited, as
are funds to operate these forces and to maintain counter-
insurgent programs. In underdeveloped countries, the cost
constraint is probably more binding than the constraint on
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available manpower. It is desirable that the government
accomplish the needed results in the most cost-effective
manner.
One method of neutralizing the insurgent movement is
to separate the insurgents from the rest of the populace.
The insurgents receive much of their supplies and intelli-
gence from the population in which they move. By separa-
ting the two, the flow may be reduced or stopped completely.
One method of separating the insurgents from the rest of
the populace is by controls imposed on the population by
the government, such as, controls on travel, controls on
food, registration of individuals, and issuance of identi-
fication cards. Once these controls have been imposed,
the government must see that the controls are being en-
forced and are effective. By establishing checkpoints
where identification papers and travel permits may be in-
spected, and by conducting periodic searches of villages
and interrogation of the residents, the government may be
able to improve the effectiveness of the controls.
The forces available to carry out these missions may
be military or paramilitary units, police units, or a com-
bined force of both. The forces used for these operations
are to be referred to as screening forces regardless of
their composition. It is assumed that at any given time
the maximum force available for screening operations is
constrained by the size of the total forces and by other





This paper is confined to one problem area in the
neutralization of the insurgent force by searching and
screening of the population. With a force of a given size
available, it must be determined when the force should be
employed and how long the operation should last. In the
remainder of this paper, one approach is developed for
solving this problem.
In the following chapters a decision model is develooed
for determining the minimum-cost plan for screening the
populace of an area to find and apprehend those who are pro-
insurgent. In Chapter II, a recursive function describing
the dynamics of insurgent growth is developed together with
a criterion function based on the costs of the screening
program. In Chapter III, a procedure is given for finding
the minimum-cost screening plan, and a numerical example




DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOTAL-COST FUNCTION
In this chapter the total-cost function for the screen-
ing plan for an area in which insurgents exist is developed.
A recursive function is developed relating the fraction of
the population which is pro-insurgent at the start of one
time period to the fraction pro-insurgent at the start of
the next time period. This relationship and certain costs
incurred by the government, are combined to form a cost
function.
The model that is developed in this chapter is similar
r 3]to a model that has been developed by Lindsay and Bishop.
They considered a multistage manufacturing process in which
prior to each manufacturing operation an opportunity exists
to inspect items for defects. The decision problem is,
where in the process to inspect, and what level of inspec-
tion should take place. The objective is to find a minimum-
cost plan for allocating inspection effort. The model
developed in this chapter is for consecutive time periods.
The defects are insurgents which exist in the populace of
an area. The costs considered are the costs incurred by
the government.
Classification of Individuals in the Populace
The population in an area in which an insurgent move-
ment exists may be divided into seven groups according to








6. Government members, (civilians)
7. Security forces.
It should be noted that it is difficult to classify an in-
dividual as being a member of a particular group. The
possible exceptions are persons who are classified as being
guerrillas or underground members , and those who are
classified as government members or members of the security
forces. The individuals in Groups 3, 4, and 5 comprise the
largest section of the populace. It is for the svmpathies
of this group that extreme groups are competing. For the
development of the model, the population is divided into
two groups, which are mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive. One groups is referred to as the pro-insur-
gents
,
and includes those people in groups 1 , 2 , and 3
above. The remainder of the populace, groups 4, 5, 6, and
7, are referred to as non-insurgents.
The Length of Time for Conducting one Screening Operation
A time period is considered to be of length d weeks,
where d is the shortest time that the screening force would
be sent into an area to inspect. The length of the time
period is determined by such factors as the time required
to move into the area, the time required to establish
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search or screening procedures and how long a time is re-
quired to inspect or search each individual or house. For
example, if an inspection consists of only checking the
identification card of an individual as he passes a village
check point, this would require less time than an inspec-
tion which involved the investigating of an individual's
background, occupation and political affiliation, and the
issuing of an identification card. If the length of time
under consideration for inspecting the area is assumed to
be T weeks, the number of time periods is n, where n is
the greatest integer in T/d. The time interval of T
weeks under consideration will be referred to as the plan-
ning period. The length of the planning period may be
determined by military or political requirements.
Screening Level and Screening Efficiency
If the screening force is sent for one time period into
an area with a population N, then the expected total number
of individuals inspected will be M. The size of the screen-
ing force, the density of the population in the area, and
how the population is distributed throughout the area are
factors on which M depends. The geographic distribution of
the population affects the number of individuals screened
in one time period by the force. For example, if the major-
ity of the population is located in one village then the
number screened would be greater than if the population is
evenly distributed throughout the area.
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The population N of an area is assumed to be constant
throughout the development of this model. Even though, in-
surgents are removed from the populace when they are de-
tected, it is felt that during the phase of the insurgency
under consideration, the per cent of the population that is
pro-insurgent may be small, and therefore the number of in-
surgents detected and removed from the area will not greatly
effect the overall population.
The screening level, Q, , is defined to be the fraction
of the population inspected during time period k, and is
the number of individuals screened, M, divided by the popu-
lation N of the area. We assume that if screening is under-
taken in time period k, the level will be Q. Therefore,
Qk - (0,0)
.
In conducting the screening operation, it is not likely
that the screening force will correctly classify all pro-
insurgent individuals inspected. The screening efficiency,
n , is defined to be the probability that a person is classi-
fied as pro-insurgent when the person actually is pro-insur-
gent. The probability of classifying an individual as pro-
insurgent when the person is actually a non-insurgent is
assumed to be zero throughout the development of this model.
Probability of Changing Allegiance
During each time period in which screening is not under-
taken, it is assumed that there is a probability that a per-
son who is non-insurgent at the start of a time period will
switch his allegiance during the period, and thus be
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pro-insurgent at the end of the period. The person may
switch due to dissatisfaction with the government, he may
switch due to coercion by insurgents , or he may switch when
it appears that the insurgents are gaining control, and
seem to be winning. The probability that a person who is
non-insurgent becoming pro-insurgent during a time period
k of length d, is denoted by q, . It is assumed that the
probability of a pro-insurgent becoming non-insurgent dur-
ing a time period is zero.
Recursive Relationships for P,
As stated earlier, the population of the area is di-
vided into two sets which are mutually exclusive and col-
lectively exhaustive. The first set consists of those indiv-
iduals who are pro-insurgents. The second set consists of
all other individuals or non-insurgents. The fraction of
the population which is pro-insurgent at the start of time
period k is denoted by p, . If there is no screening during
time period k, then the fraction of the population which is
pro-insurgent at the start of time period k+1, (the end of
time period k) is equal to the fraction of the Dooulation
which is pro-insurgent at the start of time Deriod k plus
the fraction of the population which changes allegiance
from non-insurgent to that of pro-insurgent, or
Pk+i = Pk + V 1 - Pk } - (1)
When an insurgent movement is just starting in an area
and pk is small, q^, the probability of a non-insurgent
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becoming a pro-insurgent is small. As the insurgency in-
creases and the insurgent force becomes larger and more
active, the probability of a non-insurgent becoming pro-
insurgent is larger. The larger the insurgent movement
becomes the more likely it will be that people will want
to join it. It is assumed in the development of this model
that the probability of an individual who is non-insurgent
switching to a position of pro-insurgent during a time pe-
riod when there is no screening is equal to the fraction of
the population which is pro-insurgent at the start of that
time period, i.e., (3t.=Pic « Then (1) may be written as
Pk+1 = Pk + Pk (1 " Pk>'
or
Pk+1 = 2Pk " p2k ' (2)
Subtracting both sides of (2) from unity results in
1 " Pk+1 = X " 2pk + p\ '
or
1 " Pk+1 = (1 " Pk )2 '
when the screening level is zero. If there is no inspec-
tion during time period k, the fraction of the population
which is pro-insurgent at the start of time period k+1 is





The pro-insurgent fraction of the population at the begin-
ning of time period k+2 given no screening during the time







When (3) is substituted in the equation above, we have
2
Pk+2
= X " (1 " Pk )
or
1 - pk+2 (1
- P
k'
Proceeding in a similar manner, the fraction of the popula-
tion which is pro-insurgent at the start of time period





- pk+2 } '
2
2
and replacing 1 - Pk+2 with (1 - p, ) results in
2
'k+3
= 1 - (1 " PJ 4
or
1 " Pk+3
= (1 " Pk>
Continuing in a similar manner, we find that p. qivenk+r ^
that Q. = 0, for j = k, k+1, ..., k+r-1, is
Pk+r = 1 - (1 - pk ) (4)
20
We assume that the probability of an individual changinq
his allegiance from non-insurgent to pro-insurgent is zero
during those time periods that the screening force is in
the area. Then the fraction of the population which is pro-
insurgent at the start of time period k+1 equals the fraction
P, of the population which is pro-insurgent at the start of
time period k, minus the fraction of the insurgent population
that is detected during time period k, p, nO. The recursive
equation for the fraction of the populace which is pro-insur-
gent at the start of time period k+1 , when the screening
level Q, is greater than zero, is






If the screening level is greater than zero for time period
k and k+1, then
Pk+2 = Pk+l (1 " nQK
If (5) is substituted into the above equation then
pk+2
=
Pk^ 1 " nQ^ 1 " nQ) *
Following the same procedure for Pk+3 / given screening takes
place during time period k, k+1, and k+2
,




= pk (1 " nQ) (l ~ nQ) (1 " nQ)e
In general, the fraction of the populace which is pro-in-
surgent at the start of time period k+r, given the screen-
ing force is in the area from time period k to k+r-1 is
Pk+r * Pk (1 *
•"»* (6)
if Q>0, j=k, k+1, ,.., k+r-1.
Costs to the Government
In establishing the screening program, both the cost
to the government of the screening operations and the costs
to the government of having insurgents in the area must be
considered. The screening cost, I, , for time period k is
defined as the cost to the government of screening one in-
dividual during time period k. The cost to the govern-
ment, D,, of having insurgents in an area during time peri-
od k , is defined to be the cost to the government of having
an insurgent in the area during time period k.
The screening cost includes costs associated with the
searching and screening of the area during a time period.
It may include but is not limited to such costs as the pay
of the force personnel and the cost of maintaining the force
during the period. The screening cost may include an item
such as the loss in taxes due to the screening operations
curtailing commerce and business in the area, An opportuni-
ty cost, which is a cost incurred by the government for not
having the screening forces available to be employed else-
where may also be included.
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The cost of having insurgents in the area includes the
amount of damage an insurgent can do. For example, the
amount of ' taxes ' an insurgent collects from the non-insur-
gents populace, the cost of the food, arms or other pro-
visions he can provide the insurgency, may all be included
in the cost of the insurgents. Other items that may also
be included are the cost to rebuild or repair facilities
the insurgent can destroy or damage, and the cost of pro-
viding security in the area due to the insurgent's presence.
This short discussion of each of the costs is not meant
to imply that determining these costs is easy, nor is it to
imply that the exact cost may be determined. It mav be
possible to determine the costs to within only a reasonable
range of values. Sensitivity analysis may be used to see
how varying the cost affects the solution to the problem.
The cost to the government during time period k is then
the cost of inspecting NQ individuals, plus the cost of
having the insurgents in the area. The average number of
insurgents in the area during the time period is used in
determining the insurgent cost to the government. The aver-
age number of insurgents in time period k is determined by
averaging the number of insurgents at the start of time peri-
od k and k+1. The cost to the government for time period k
is denoted by ck (QjJ/ and is
X + pk+lC
k (V - VQk + DkN (7)
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= pk
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3pk " P k when 0, = 0.
~k




+ pk (1 " nQ)
= p, (2 - nQ)
and
Ck (Q)
= IkNQ + DkN
Pv( 2 - nQ)
The total-cost, TC , to the government for a planning
period is the sum of the costs for each of the n time peri-
ods , or
n n
TC = I C (Q ) = I I NQ + D N
k=l K K k=l K K K
Pk + Pk+ 1
(8)
Assuming that the screening costs, I. , and the insurgent




TC = I C (Q ) = I INQ + DN
k=l * K k=l K
Pk + ?k+ l
(9)
Setup Costs
In the development of the total-cost function, (9)
,
the only costs considered are the unit screening costs, I,
and the costs to the government of having each insurgent in
the area, D. An additional cost that must be considered is
a setup cost. The setup cost is the cost incurred to go in-
to an area, establish and setup a force to screen, it may
also include the cost of training the screening force.
The setup cost incurred during time period k is denoted by
S,. A force which is in an area screening for one of more
consecutive time periods incurs the setup cost only when it
first enters the area. The setup cost is assumed to be a
constant cost that the force incurs when it re-enters an
area after not screening for one or more time periods.
We may now write the total-cost function as,
pk + Pk+1n nTC = I C (Q ) = I INQ + DN
k=l K K k=l K
+ Sk e (10)
where e is zero if Q, , is and is one if O, , is zero.k-1 ~k-l
Protection Cost
At the end of the planning period, the screening force
may be withdrawn from the area. With its departure, local
forces in the area would assume the missions of protecting
the people and the government facilities. An example of
this is in the article referred to in Chapter I, where the
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mere presence of the popular forces helped protect the
village, even though this was not the primary mission of
the force. When the popular forces left the village, the
defense or the security of the village was the responsibil-
ity of the village defense force. It is reasonable to as-
sume that the size of the defense force would depend on the
seriousness of the threat to the village. The greater the
pro-insurgent fraction of the populace, the greater is the
threat to the villagers. As the size of the defense force
increases so does the cost of maintaining it.
The cost of providing this security or protection to
the non-insurgent populace will be termed the protection
cost. This cost is assumed to be proportional to the
fraction of the population which is pro-insurgent at the
end of the planning period. The protection cost is de-
fined to be the product of the cost L to the government of
providing security forces in an area in which screening of
the populace has terminated, per insurgent in the area at
that time, and the number of insurgents, i.e., LNP ..
Adding the protection cost to (10) we find that
TC =AW + LN Pn+ 1 (11)k=l
n
=








where z is zero if Qi. -i is Q and is one if Qk i is zero.
With the total-cost function developed, the next prob-
lem is to find a sequence of screening decisions, 0. q
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•••/ Q_/ such that the total-cost function, (11) is a
minimum. In the next chapter, a procedure for determining
the sequence of screening levels that minimizes the total-
cost function will be developed.
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CHAPTER III
DETERMINING THE MINIMUM TOTAL-COST SCREENING PLAN
In this chapter a procedure is presented to identify
those time periods during which screening operations should
be scheduled. The procedure is illustrated with a numerical
example. Two possible heuristics which could reduce the
amount of calculations necessary to determine the proper
sequency of screening operations are discussed in the last
section.
Procedure to Determine Minimum-Cost Screening Plan
Before showing the procedure for determining the
minimum-cost screening plan, we shall simplify the equations
for the cost function C, (Q, ) by introducing three new varia-
bles, B, W and Z. The total cost to the government for a
screening plan is the sum of the costs for each of the n
time periods. The cost for each time period, Ck (Qk ), ^e
~
pends on the screening level for that period. Setting Q,











Let B be defined as nQ and Z is defined to be equal to







Setting Q, equal to Q, the cost function for time period k
is
Ck (Q)
= INQ + ^ pk + pk (l - nQ)
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+ Sk c ,
where e is zero when Qy
(i
_ 1
is Q and is one when Qk , is
zero. Substituting Z, B, and w, where W is defined to be
equal to IN/n
, in the above equation, results in
Ck (B)
= WB + BZ(2pk - pkB) + Sk e, (14)
where e is zero when Qk _i is Q and is one when Qk-1 is
zero.
The procedure used to find the minimum total-cost
screening plan is from the theory of graphs, and is used
to find the shortest path between two points in a graph.
Before explaining the procedure, some definitions from the
theory of graphs must be presented. A graph is a set of
points connected to one another by lines. The points are
called nodes and are juncture points for the lines connec-
ting them. The lines joining the modes are referred to as
arcs. The length of an arc connecting node a and node b
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may be the distance between the two nodes. For the
minimum total-cost screening plan, the length of the arcs
is the cost of going from node a to node b. The nodes of
the graph in our problem are points in time, i.e., the be-
ginning of each time period k. The origin node of the
graph is the point from which the path begins and the ter-
minal node is the destination of the path.
To solve the minimum total-cost problem by use of the
theory of graphs, the nodes are considered to be the frac-
tion of the population which is pro-insurgent at the start
k-1
of each time period. Time period k will have 2 nodes.
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The node p, , . is the j node in time period k. The length
of an arc connecting two nodes is the cost to the govern-
ment, Cv^Qb.) i to 9° from one node to another. Since the
screening for each time period is either at a zero level
or at Q, there are two arcs incident from each node , for
time periods 1 through n. There is one arc incident from
each node in time period n+1, that represents the protec-
tion cost to the government at the end of time T. For
nodes in time period 1 to n, one arc incident from a node
k,j is the cost to the government when a screening opera-
tion is conducted, including setup costs, if applicable.
The setup cost is applicable if, the arc incident to node
k,j is the cost when no screening occurs in time period
k-1. The second arc is the cost to the government for not
screening. In Figure 1 is an example of a graph for deter-
mining the minimum total-cost screening plan with n equal
to four, i.e., four time periods. Only one arc is incident
from each of the 2 nodes in time period n+1 and is inci-
dent to the terminal node. The length of each of these
arcs represent the protection cost, which depends on
P , . . The minimum total-cost screening plan is repre-
sented in the graph by the shortest path from node p, ,
to the terminal node.
Solving the Shortest-Path Problem
What is presented below is just one method of solving
the shortest-path problem. The algorithm is presented

























example, which is shown in Figure 1 in graph form. First the
origin node is marked with a zero. We next determine nodes
having an arc incident to them which is incident from the
origin node. For each such node, we will determine its dis-
tance from the origin node. Having determined the distance
for each node, we will determine the node with the minimum
distance and mark it with this distance. At this point there
are two marked nodes. Again we will determine the nodes each
having an arc incident to it which is incident from a marked
node. For each node we found, its distance from the origin
is determined. The node with the minimum distance is marked
with this distance. We continue this procedure until the
terminal node is marked. The path of marked nodes from the
origin to the terminal node is the shortest path and the dis-
tance that marks the terminal node is the length of the path.
If when determining which node is the next to be marked there
are two or more nodes with the same minimum distance from the
origin, mark all such nodes and continue as before.
We may summarize the procedure presented above as follows
1. Mark the initial node.
2. Find the unmarked nodes that are connected to
marked nodes.
3. For each such node calculate its distance from
the origin.
4. Determine which of the unmarked nodes is nearest
the origin and mark it with the distance.
iz
5. If the node marked in step 4 is the terminal node,
the shortest path has been marked, if it is not,
return to step 2.
In the cost problem we are addressing, the arcs are
labeled with the costs incurred by the government during
a time period k. An arc labeled with C, .(0) , where
C, .(0) is equal to 4.2, indicates it costs the govern-K
r J
ment 4.2 units if it does not screen during time period k,
given the fraction of insurgents is that indicated at the
node p, ., from which the arc originates.
In Table I, C
2
,(0) is the cost to the government if
there is no screening in time period 2, given the fraction
of insurgents at the start of time period 2 is p? , ,
C 2 l^) equals $296,520. The cost to inspect in time peri-
od 2, given p2 , is C- , (B) and is equal to $215,375.
The nodes are labeled with the fraction of the popula-
tion which is pro-insurgent at the start of the time period,
given the screening plan indicated by the arcs from the
origin to the node is followed. The fraction of insurgents
at the start of time period 3, given no screening during
time period 1 and 2 , is p 3 , and is equal to 0.0394.
Following a path from the origin to node p. 3 , in Figure
1, it is found that p 4 3 is the result of not screening
during periods 1 and 3 and screening during period 2. This
results in p. -> having a value of 0.02963.
33
TABLE I
CALCULATED VALUES FOR NODES AND
ARCS FOR THE NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
k J PM Ck .(0) Cki (B)
1 1 0.01000 $149,500. $128,750.
2 1 .01990 296,520. 215,375.
2 2 ,00750 112,219. 96,875.
3 1 .03940 583,296. 386,035.
3 2 .01492 222,761. 161,844.
3 3 .01494 223,039. 172,008.
3 4 .00562 84,217. 80,469.
4 1 .07726 1,128,986. 717,233.
4 2 ,02996 438,927. 289,838.
4 3 .02963 440,019. 300,488.
4 4 .01119 167,280. 129,195.
4 5 .02966 440,562. 300,811.
4 6 .01121 167,489. 129,318.
4 7 .01122 167,646. 139,410.
4 8 .00422 63,192. 68,164.
k J pki
Protection Cost for Node k,j
5 1 0.14854 $1,485,421.
5 2 .05794 579,414.
5 3 .05823 582,326.
5 4 .02216 221,647.



























Note: The protection cost for node k,j is calculated
prior to rounding off of p.^. All costs are
rounded off to the nearest dollar.
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A Numerical Example
In the example in Figure 1, the assumed data is;
Screening level, Q = 0.3125
Screening efficiency, n =0.80
Fraction of populace pro-
insurgent at start of
time period one, p, , =0.10
Cost to government to screen
one individual, I = $10.00
Cost to government per
insurgent in the area, D = $1000.00
Setup cost to the Government, S = $10,000.00
Protection cost to the 3
Government, LNp ,, = $ (p^,, x N x 10 )c n+i n+i
Population of Area, N = 10,000
Number of time periods, n =4
Using this data the following terms are determined;
B = nQ = (0.8) (0.3125) = 0.25
w= IN = (10)(10,000) = 1>25 x 1Q 5
n u • o
7 DN _ (1000) (10,000) v ln 7Z " 2B (2) (0.25) 2 x 10
The cost for each arc and the fraction of the popula-
tions which is pro-insurgent for each node, Table I , is
determined by using (13), (14), (3) and (5). It should
be noted that it is not necessary to calculate all the
values that are in Table I as has been done. In solving
the minimum-cost problem, only the fraction pro-insurgent
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and the costs related to the nodes under consideration
to be marked need be calculated. Using the values from
Table I, an example is given below illustrating the pro-
cedure described in the previous section. The node reo-
resenting the initial insurgent fraction of the popula-
tion, p, , , is the first node marked and is the origin.
The next node to be marked is the node that is nearest the
origin. To find which node it is, the cost to go from the
origin to each of the nodes, p 2 , and p2 2 is calculated.
The minimum cost is found to be to node p 2 2 with a cost
of $128,750. Therefore node p 2 2 is marked with its
total-cost. The total-cost to the government, TC, ., for
screening operations and insurgents ' presence in the area
for the first k-1 time periods, is the sum of the cost
arcs from the origin to the node p, . . The next step is
to determine which nodes are connected to the marked nodes.
The nodes p 3 - and p 3 . are connected to marked mode p 2 2
and node p 2 , is connected to the origin. To determine







are evaluated and compared. The total costs are found to
be $240,969, $225,625 and $149,500 respectively. Since
TC
2
, is the minimum, node p 2 , is marked with its total-
cost. At this point, nodes p, , , p- , and d 2 2 are marked
and the total-costs for nodes p 3 , and p 3 2 have to be
determined so that they may be compared to TC 3 3 and TC 3 ^.




TOTAL COST FOR NODES IN TIME PERIOD 3





From Table II it may be seen that node p., . has the minimum
total-cost and is to be marked.
Repeating the steps given in the previous section, the
next node marked is p., -. , followed by node p. R . At this
stage the marked nodes are p, ,
, p 2 , , p„ 2 , p~ , , p_ .,
and p. g. Table III lists the unmarked nodes which are
connected to the marked nodes.
TABLE III
TOTAL COST FOR UNMARKED NODES











From the table, it may be seen that node p. _ has the
minimum total-cost and is marked. Repeating the procedure
of finding new unmarked nodes and calcualting their total-
cost, the next node to be marked is d ~ followed by p c , c .
At this point it is necessary to calculate the pro-
tection cost for node p 5 15 . The protection cost equals
the product of the number of pro-insurgents in the popula-
tion at the start of time point n+1, and a constant. The
constant is the cost of protecting the area per insurgent.
In this example, the cost is assumed to be $1000. per
insurgent. Using the protection cost from Table I for
node p 5 15 , the total-cost for the terminal node through
this node is $453,483. Comparing this total-cost with
the total-cost for other unmarked nodes, p 5 ,g is marked.
The protection cost from Table I, plus the total-
cost for node p c , r results in a total-cost for the ter-
^5 , 16
minal node for the path through p g lg of $405,899. This
total-cost is compared to the total-cost for the other
nodes which are unmarked and connected to marked nodes.
The result of this comparison is that the total-cost for
the terminal node with the path through p 5 16 is the
minimum. Therefore the terminal node is marked.
With the terminal node marked, the minimum total-
cost path has been determined. The path is from the origin
through marked nodes P 2 o' p 34' p 4 8' an(^ p 516 to the ter
"
minal node. This path results in a total cost to the gov-
ernment of $405,899, and corresponds to.screehing during
i9
each of the four time periods, with the given force.
This plan results in the fraction of the population which
is pro-insurgent being reduced from an average of ten per
thousand to an average of three per thousand.
Heuristics Solutions
The example in the previous section illustrates a
drawback to the use of the shortest path algorithm to find
the minimum-cost screening plan. This is the rate at
which the number of possible paths increase with an in-
crease in n, the number of time periods. In a problem
where the number of time periods is ten, at the end of
the tenth time period there are 2 > or 1024 possible
paths from the origin to the terminal node. For a prob-
lem with n time periods, the number of possible paths is
2
n
. It may not be necessary to check all the paths to
find the path corresponding to the minimum-cost plan but
the amount of calculation still could be quite large. A
computer program could be written that could do all the
calculations required and determine the minimum-cost path,
but for an individual attempting to solve the problem which
has a large number of time periods, a heuristic he could
follow may save him hours of work.
A basic concept underlies each of the two approaches
used to derive a heuristic. The first concept Is to con-
sider only one time period at a time, and to take that
action which costs the least in that period, i.e., screen
the populate or not. For example in time period one, assume
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that it is less costly to screen than not to screen. You
would then decide to screen the populace. At the start
of the second time period you will have reduced the pro-
insurgent fraction of the populace. Using the resultant
p 2 , you would determine what would be the least costly
action for the second time period, given you screened in
the first period. Following the heuristic, you would con-
tinue to select the least costly action for each time
period k, given p, .
Using the values for the previous example in Table
I, and our heuristic, we find that for the first time peri-
od we would screen the populace, since C. . (B) is less
than C. ,(0). With the pro-insurgent fraction of the popu-
lace now being equal to p- ~ , for the second time period
again we would screen, since ^
2 ,2 (B) is less than C 2 2 (0) *
Continuing in the same manner in the third time period we
would screen, but in the fourth period we would not since
C„ o (0) is less than C„ (B) . Adding the protection cost
for node p 5 , 5 to the costs for the four time periods, we
find a total-cost for this screening plan to be $453,483,
which is not too great an increase over the optimal solu-
tion of $405,899. In other examples on which this heuris-
tic has been used, the results have not been good, in that
the solution which results is some times one of the most
costly. This is a result of being off the path for the
optimal solution in the early time periods. Once the path
using the heuristic is off the optimal path, there is no
way to return to it.
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The concept underlying the second approach to a heuris-
tic is that the screening plan is cyclic. There is a phase
when screening operations are conducted for a number of
consecutive time periods, followed by a phase when no
screening is done for a number of time periods, followed
again by a phase of screening. The second approach is to
determine the length of a phase of screening or of no
screening, given the pro-insurgent fraction of the popula-
tion at the start of the phase. If a sequence of time
periods during which screening occurs starts with time
period k and ends with time period k+r, we want to deter-
mine what r is. The same is true of a sequence of time pe-
riods during which no screening is taking place. A se-
quence of time periods during which no screening occurs
is assumed to terminate when it is less costly to screen
than not,
C. ^ (B) < C. _, (0) (15)k+r k+r
where




C, . (B) = WB + ZB(2p.^ - p. L B) + S, . (17)k+r ^k+r ^k+r k+r
Substituting in the two equations above for pt ,,






and simplifying, (15) may be written
S r r+1
! " B +
-W- < <1 - B) (1 - Pk )
2




Using this inequality, the largest integer value of r
satisfying it is determined. Then the sequence of no
screening operations ends with the termination of time
period k+r-1.
The same method is used to determine when a sequence
of consecutive time periods in which screening operations
are conducted terminates. In this case ,
<WB) > Ck+ r <0) (19)
and screening has been conducted since time period k. The
fraction in this insurgent Pk+r is
Pk+r = Pk (1
" B)r (20)
Substituting (20) in for Pk+r in (19) and simplifying, we
have
| > p (1 - B) r (l + B - pk (l - B) r ). (21)
Again the largest integer value of r for which the inequal-
ity holds is determined. By using (18) and (21) and the
recursive equations for pk , it is possible to
determine the
length of the sequences of screening and no screening and
to construct a screening plan. Employing this method on the
example problem, results in a path of nodes p 1 ^ , P 2 ,2' D 3,4
p and p 15 . As before,
the cost of this path is
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somewhat greater than the optimal. In other examples, the
difference between the optical solution and the solutions
using this heuristic is extremely large. Again the problem
is when the path using the heuristic becomes non-ootimal




In Chapters II and III, one method of solving the
problem of when to screen the populace of an area has
been developed. The model developed is one of sequential
decision making, where at specific points in time decisions
are made whether to screen the populace or not.
In Chapter II, a recursive relationship has been
developed which relates the pro-insurgent fraction of the
population at the start of a time period with the fraction
at the start of the previous time period. A cost function
based upon cost of the screening operation, the cost of the
insurgents being in the area, the cost of setting up or
initiating a screening operation, and the cost of insur-
gents being in the area at the termination of all screen-
ing operations has also been developed. In Chapter III,
a procedure has been developed for finding the minimum-
cost screening plan using a shortest-path algorithm from
the theory of graphs. Through this procedure it may be
possible to find the minimum-cost solution without eval-
uating all possible screening plans.
Areas for Further Studies
In the development of the model, the only criterion
used has been the cost to the government. No attempt has
been made to integrate this model into the overall counter-
insurgency strategy. It has been isolated from other
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possible programs that the government mav institute to
compliment the screening operations, such as a pacifica-
tion program, or large-scale military operations. If the
insurgents are active militarily then operations which will
reduce their military capabilities would probably be con-
ducted. Pacification programs may be deemed necessary to
increase the people's allegiance to the government.
A number of assumptions have been made during the
development of the model, all of which are areas for fur-
ther study and possible refinement. It has been assumed
that the probability that a person who is non-insurgent
becoming pro-insurgent during a time period being equal
to the pro-insurgent fraction of the population at the
start of the time period. This seems a reasonable approx-
imation, but the impact of other relationships on the model
could be investigated.
It has been assumed that the probability of a non-
insurgent becoming pro-insurgent is zero when the govern-
ment is in the area screening. If this assumption is
dropped, the problem may have to be structured differently.
The screening operations might be conducted in such a man-
ner as to antagonize the populace, and thus Increase the
number of people who are pro-insurgent.
Another simplification has been the partitioning of
the populace into two sets, pro-insurgents and non-insur-
gents. Each set has been treated as if it is humoqen^ous
,
al] type's of individuals being equally difficult to
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detect if they are insurgents, or being equally difficult
to convert if they are government supporters. It has also
been assumed that the cost to the government is the same
for each insurgent for the time they are allowed to be in
an area. A further extension of this model would be to
subdivide each of the two groups into a hierarchy of sub-
groups, along with related probabilities and costs.
The assigning of values to the parameters is an area
which may be examined further. Methods should be studied
so that the most accurate values for the screening level,
the screening efficiency, and the initial pro-insurgent
fraction of the population may be obtained for use in the
model. The problem of estimating the cost involved in the
cost function is extremely difficult. It may be necessary
to do sensitivity analysis to determine how variations in
the costs affect the results of the model for given values
of the other parameters.
An extension of the problem of the minimum-cost
screening plan is to consider what size screening force
should be used, such that 0, may vary between zero and some
. The upper limit Q would be when all availabley
raax
^^ max
screening forces were used in the area during a time peri-
od. Another extension is the problem of when to screen,
given there is more than one area under consideration,
but the forces are not adequate to screen all areas simul-
taneously. It may be found that the forces should be
divided into a number of smaller forces and each assigned
4/
a number of areas to screen. The entire force may be kept
as one unit and rotated among the different areas. What
exists is a queuing problem where the areas are waiting
to be serviced.
There may exist military or political requirements
that the pro-insurgent fraction of the populace is to
be less than some given value q 1 , , at the end of the^
^n+1
planning period. The problem of determining the minimum-
cost screening plan where q , must be less than q'-i is
another possible extension.
As it may be seen, what has been done in this paper
is just a beginning in the development of one approach to
the problem of population screening and search. On this
approach alone, much remains to be studied, along with
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